UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-11-2020

State v. Pittman Appellant's Brief Dckt. 47405

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Pittman Appellant's Brief Dckt. 47405" (2020). Not Reported. 6337.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6337

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
3/11/2020 2:11 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #10585
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id. us

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

LENNIE JAY PITTMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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MADISON COUNTY NO. CR33-19-317
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lennie Jay Pittman pied guilty to forgery. He was sentenced to a unified term of five
years, with two years fixed. Mr. Pittman asserts that the district court imposed an excessive
sentence and that it abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 Motion.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In late February 2019, a criminal complaint was filed against Mr. Pittman alleging one
count of forgery. (R., p.7.) Police had been called to a Broulim's grocery store in Rexburg
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because the store's employees suspected Mr. Pittman of passing a bad check. (PSI, p.3.)
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Mr. Pittman was later located at the residence of his co-defendant and arrested. (PSI, p.71.)
Mr. Pittman waived his preliminary hearing and he was bound over to the district court.
(R., pp. I 1, 13.) An Information charging Mr. Pittman with forgery was then filed. (R., pp.17-18.)
The State also filed an Information Part II with a persistent violator enhancement per Idaho
Code§ 19-2514. (R., pp.14-15.) Mr. Pittman was arraigned on both parts and pled not guilty.
(R., p.19.)
A plea agreement was reached where Mr. Pittman agreed to plead guilty to forgery testify
against three named co-defendants in exchange for the State dropping the persistent violator
enhancement. (R., pp. 22-24.) As part of that agreement, the State was not bound to any specific
sentencing recommendation. (See R., p.23.) The court accepted Mr. Pittman's plea and a
sentencing date was set. (R., p.21; Tr., pp.4-14.)
Mr. Pittman then applied for drug court, but was denied. (R., p.30.) Mr. Pittman was then
sentenced to serve five years, with two years fixed. (See generally Tr., pp.15-31; R., pp.33-35.)
The next week, Mr. Pittman filed a Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 35. (R., p.38.) A hearing was held on that Motion and it was denied by the court. (See

generally Tr., pp.32-37; R., p.41.)2
Mr. Pittman timely appealed from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.43-45.)

1

References to the PSI refer to the pdf file in the record titled "Confidential Documents Record
Appeal."
2
Mr. Pittman does not challenge the denial of his Rule 35 Motion as no new information was
presented with that motion. See State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) ("An appeal from
the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence
absent the presentation of new information").
2

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of five years, with
two years fixed, upon Mr. Pittman following his plea of guilty to forgery?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Five Years,
With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Pittman Following His Plea Of Guilty To Forgery

A.

Introduction
Mr. Pittman asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of five years,

with two years fixed, is excessive. He also asserts that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his Rule 35 Motion. He contends the district court failed to properly consider
mitigating evidence in both rulings.

B.

Standard Of Review
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, the

appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.

See State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002);
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). "Once a criminal defendant's guilt has been
established, the trial judge is under a duty to tailor the sentence to the individual defendant."

State v. Dallas, 109 Idaho 670, 675 (1985). When a sentence is reviewed, the reviewing court
will "consider the defendant's entire sentence." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007).
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However, the reviewing court will "treat the minimum period specified by the sentencing judge
as the probable duration of confinement." State v. Phillips, 121 Idaho 261, 262 (Ct. App. 1992).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "' [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573 (1979)).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (emphasis in original). However, "[ e]ven
where the district court appropriately understands its discretion and sentences a defendant
according to the applicable legal principles, an unreasonably excessive sentence can still be an
abuse of discretion, and this Court can reduce the sentence." State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 835
(2011).
In Idaho, "the primary objective of sentencing is protection of society" as well as the
"related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution." State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447,
(2019). "A sentence of confinement fixed for longer than necessary to accomplish these purposes
is unreasonable." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 284 (2003). "Moreover, it is clear, as a matter
of policy in Idaho, that the primary consideration is 'the good order and protection of society.'
All other factors must be subservient to that end." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct.
App. 1982) (quoting State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 363 (1956)).
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C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Properly Considering Mitigating
Evidence When It Sentenced Mr. Pittman And When It Denied His Rule 35 Motion
Here, Mr. Pittman was given a check for $389.23 made out to a fictitious person, and

then talked into cashing the check by using fake identification he was given for that person. (see
PSI, pp.3, 4, 81, 109.) For that crime, the State recommended a sentence of 12 years, with four
years fixed, as it would match the sentence imposed on his co-defendant. (Tr., p.20, Ls. I 0-22.)
Counsel for Mr. Pittman argued that was "excessive," and, if the court was unwilling to consider
probation, a retained jurisdiction or no more than "one or two years fixed" would be more
appropriate. (See Tr., p.26, L.1 - p.27, L.6.) Mr. Pittman acknowledges that the district court did
give some consideration to the assistance he gave the police, and "based on what [he] did do in
this case, [it was] going to give [him] some credit for the cooperation [he] provided." (Tr., p.29,
Ls.7-14.) The court then imposed a sentence of five years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.29,
Ls.17-23.) Mr. Pittman asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed
incarceration by not properly considering all of the other mitigating evidence in the record
regarding his mental health problems, abusive childhood, remorse for his actions, or his
willingness and desire for rehabilitation.
Courts are required to consider a defendant's mental health condition as part of
sentencing because "Idaho Code § 19-2523, which requires that the trial court consider the
defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor, was an integral part of the legislature's repeal of
mental condition as a defense." State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 (1994).
Here, there is no indication that the court gave any consideration to the substantial
evidence in the record indicating potentially undiagnosed mental health problems. The
presentence investigator characterized Mr. Pittman as unstable and a "risk to himself and others."
(PSI, p.18 (recommending incarceration after "considering the defendant's instability" among
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other factors).) Throughout the presentence investigation process, Mr. Pittman said he had been
diagnosed with bipolar depression and was being treated for that diagnosis by the Department of
Health and Welfare while he was being held in the county jail. (PSI, pp.27-28; see also pp.14-15,
22, 34, 36, 38.)
Until the arrest in this case, Mr. Pittman had never received any form of mental health
diagnosis or treatment. (PSI, p.15.) But during the GAIN-I evaluation process, a number of
"Rule Out diagnoses" were identified, including "Major Depressive Disorder ... With Psychotic
Features."3 (PSI, pp.22, 34.) The evaluator noted that Mr. Pittman "scored in the moderate range
of the Internal Mental Distress Scale [and] self-reported symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of
a mood disorder," then provided an expansive list of symptoms Mr. Pittman reported
experiencing during the previous 12 months supporting that provisional diagnosis. 4 (PSI, pp.26-

3

The GAIN evaluation identifies "Emotional/Behavioral Conditions and Complications" to
facilitate recommendations for rehabilitative treatment. (PSI, p.34.) When the evaluator is not
licensed to make mental health diagnoses, the term "rule out" "is commonly used in patient care
to eliminate a suspected condition or disease. It is a 'provisional' diagnosis made when there is a
strong presumption that the full criteria will be met for the disorder. It means 'probable',
'suspected', or 'likely'". (PSI, p.34; see also PSI, p.36 ("The use of "rule out" indicates that the
diagnosis as generated by the GAIN, is provisional.").)
4
This list is representative of similar lists compiled by the evaluator for the other mental
health areas which can be found in their entirety at the pages cited. This particular list has
been given in its entirety only to show the extent of mental health symptoms Mr. Pittman
reported.
[Mr. Pittman] reported last feeling significantly disturbed by any kind of nerve,
mental, or psychological problems 4 to 12 months ago. He described experiencing
the following significant problems over the past 12 months: headaches, faintness,
dizziness, tingling, numbness, sweating or hot or cold spells; pain or a heavy
feeling in the heart, chest, lower back, arms, legs or other muscles; feeling very
trapped, lonely, sad, blue, depressed, or hopeless about the future; remembering,
concentrating, making decisions, or having his mind go blank; thoughts of not
being understood by other people or that other people did not appreciate his
situation; feeling easily annoyed, irritated, or having trouble controlling a temper;
feeling tired, having no energy, or being unable to get things done; losing interest
or pleasure in work, school, friends, sex or other things that were previously cared
about; losing or gaining 10 or more pounds when not trying to; moving and
6

27.) Over the past twelve months, Mr. Pittman also "endorsed expenencmg [numerous]
problems related to ADHD [and many] behaviors related to Antisocial Personality Disorder."
(PSI, p.27.) He also "self-reported symptoms sufficient to meet criteria for amphetamine use
disorder severe." (PSI, p.23.) Mr. Pittman also stated that he had attempted to commit "suicide
by hanging himself' in December 2018. (PSI, pp.27, 34, 37.) The evaluator commented that
"[t]hrough clinical observation, a co-existing emotional/behavioral condition is predicted to
interfere with his ability to remain abstinent, which requires continuous intervention."
(PSI, p.34.)

Mr. Pittman acknowledges that the "staff observed no indications of developmental
disabilities and no evidence of cognitive impairment" (PSI, p.27), despite having "a history of
attendance in special education classes" (PSI, p.27), being unable to complete more than a sixthgrade education due to "deficits in comprehension, reading, spelling, etc." (PSI, p.14), and
grades of "D's" for those years he was actually in school. (PSI, p.31.) The GAIN evaluator
"recommended that [Mr. Pittman] be monitored for change in mental health symptoms."

talking much slower than usual; having to repeat an action over and over, or
having thoughts that kept running over in his mind; trembling, having a racing
heart, or feeling so restless that it was impossible to sit still; avoiding snakes, the
dark, being alone, elevators or other things because they were frightening;
thoughts of being taken advantage of, not being given credit by other people, or
having problems caused by other people; thoughts of being watched or followed
by someone or that someone was out to get him; seeing or hearing things that no
one else could see or hear or feeling that thoughts could be read or controlled by
someone else; having a lot of tension or muscle aches because of feeling worried;
being unable or finding it difficult to control worrying. [Mr. Pittman] did not
report having homicidal thoughts for someone else and reported thinking about
committing suicide during the past 12 months. During the past week,
[Mr. Pittman] reported that he has not had suicidal thoughts.
During the assessment, [Mr. Pittman] reported he attempted suicide by hanging
himself on 12/30/18. He reported that he has not been suicidal since then.
[Mr. Pittman] did not appear to be a danger to himself or others.
(PSI, p.27 (emphasis in original).)
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(PSI, p.34.) The mental health evaluator did not make any recommendations to the court because
Mr. Pittman was "receiving [mental health] services" from the Department of Health and
Welfare; however, that report also said that "[w]ithout some form of treatment, it is likely
[Mr. Pittman] will continue to struggle with symptoms and problems may increase." (PSI, p.38.)
Mr. Pittman also asserts that the district court did not properly consider the impact of his
abusive childhood and early drug use as mitigating. The impact of abusive childhoods and the
age at which the defendant's drug or alcohol use began should also weigh in favor of the
defendant. See State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001) ("While Williams'
extremely troubled childhood is a factor that bears consideration at sentencing, against it must be
weighed the heinous nature of his offense and the danger that Williams presents to society");

State v. Gonzales, 123 Idaho 92, 93-94 (Ct. App. 1993) (highlighting that the defendant, who
was eighteen at the time of the offense, had dropped out of high school, had been "subjected to
an abusive childhood, living in numerous broken homes," and "was introduced to drugs and
alcohol at a very young age and admit[ted] to being chemically dependent," but finding no abuse
of discretion in sentencing).
Here, Mr. Pittman reported a "significant history of childhood victimization and that he
has not received help to cope with his past trauma." (PSI, p.34.) He reported suffering physical,
sexual, and emotional abuse as a child. (PSI, p.22.) Due to that abuse, he "rebelled and ran away
from home when he was only

and "'hitchhik[ed] around the United States' for the

next four years." (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Pittman also knows he needs help with his life-long drug
addiction. (See PSI, p.18 ("To his credit, the defendant admitted his recurring problems with
substance abuse. Mr. Pittman also noted a desire to attend treatment, in order to facilitate
sobriety long-term.").) He began using drugs between the ages of seven and nine. (PSI, p.11 ("[I]
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got on drugs when I was

(reporting "first using any alcohol or other drugs at

age 7").) His "older brothers all struggled with drug abuse and introduced [him] to drugs."
(PSI, p.11.) He began using methamphetamine around age fourteen, and he likes "to use [it] the
most." (PSI, p.23.)
Finally, Mr. Pittman asserts that the court did not properly consider his acceptance of
responsibility for his actions. A defendant's acceptance of responsibility for their actions,
together with a need for and willingness to participate in drug or alcohol rehabilitation, should
also be considered as mitigating by the court. See Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595 (1982) (reducing
indeterminate portion of sentence for robbery based on, among other things, defendant's
voluntary drug addiction rehabilitation and acceptance of responsibility for his actions); State v.
Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding a "willingness to seek treatment for an
alcohol problem [was a ] mitigating circumstance[]" taken into account by the court before
finding that Coffin's sentence was not excessive) (internal quotation marks removed). Substance
abuse should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when imposing sentence.
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). Leniency is required when the defendant expresses "remorse
for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other
positive attributes ofhis character." State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Here, Mr. Pittman has recognized his actions were not appropriate and expressed remorse
for his involvement in this crime. He pled guilty and told the court he had "passed a hot check"
and knew it was forged when he did it. (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-15.) At sentencing he told the court he
wanted "to apologize to the court system and to Broulim's for my actions." (Tr., p.27, Ls.12-13.)
As soon as he was arrested, he admitted to police what he had done. (See PSI, pp.72-75, 81-87,
109-112.) He said he participated in the scheme because he "was homeless and needed money so
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[he] took [the check] into the store and cashed it." (PSI, p.4.) He then proceeded to provide the
police with information that led to the discovery of additional evidence and charges against his
co-defendants. (See Tr., p.25, Ls.18-22; PSI, pp.3-4, 71-76, 80-81.) These were not the actions of
an individual trying to conceal or minimize his actions, something the court recognized at
sentencing. (See, e.g., Tr., p.29, Ls.7-14.)
But he has said that his goal now is to get "off drugs" because "his 'drug abuse' has been
a long-term problem." (PSI, pp.16.) He told the presentence investigator, "I need help with drugs
I have been on drugs all my life and it has been my down fall." (PSI, p.11.) During the course of
the criminal investigation, Officer Nunnelly of the Idaho Falls Police Department reported that
Mr. Pittman "admitted to having a drug problem and said he was trying to get help." (PSI, p.66.)
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel spoke with the court about how Mr. Pittman wanted
"to focus on rehabilitation" and how he had "never been [given] a significant opportunity for
rehabilitation." (Tr., p.22, Ls.2,14-15.) He explained that Mr. Pittman "was using controlled
substances even at the time, the same day that this incident occurred." (Tr., p.22, Ls.17-19.)
When Mr. Pittman was told about how the problem-solving courts "focus[ed] on rehabilitation
and treatment and after care . . . he thought that that would be a wonderful opportunity."
(Tr., p.22, Ls.22-25.) Unfortunately for Mr. Pittman, an outstanding misdemeanor warrant out of
Texas, his criminal background, and the drug court team's worry about his high-risk for
reoffending and absconding all led to his drug court application being denied. (Tr., p.23, Ls.223.) Despite that, during the time that he was incarcerated, he was voluntarily participating in a
"12-step program, trying to get what treatment he could and trying to do what he could on his
own to address substance abuse issues while he's been in custody." (Tr., p.25, Ls.13-16.)
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Mr. Pittman asked the court for the opportunity to "get into some programs and end [his] drug
addiction." (Tr., p.27, Ls.13-14.)
Accordingly, Mr. Pittman asserts that the court abused its discretion by failing to consider
all of the mitigating evidence in the record.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Pittman respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 11 th day of March, 2020.

/s/ R. Jonathan Shirts
R. JONATHAN SHIRTS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of March, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW, to
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Kylie M. Fourtner
KYLIE M. FOURTNER
Administrative Assistant
RJS/kmf
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